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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,:
vs.

:

BERT JAMES DURRANT,

Case No. 14478

:

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Bert James Durrant, appeals
from a conviction of the crime of automobile homicide in the
Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Bert James Durrant, was found guilty
by a jury, of the crime of automobile homicide, on January 13,
1976, was thereafter sentenced to a term of five (5) years
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probation and to serve thirty (30) days in the Utah County
Jail.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction
of the crime of automobile homicide, or in the alternative,
a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 2:01 a.m. on the morning
of April 17, 1975, the Appellant, Bert James Durrant, and
three other persons riding in Appellant's vehicle, were involved in a collision with an unoccupied piece of construction
equipment in the vicinity of 695 East 7Q0 North, American
Fork, Utah.

(R.47-54)

One of the occupants of Appellant's

vehicle was killed in the collision, and Appellant and two
other occupants of the car were critically injured.
41)

(R.5Q-

Appellant was taken to the emergency room at the American

Fork Hospital for treatment.

(R.51-52)

Shortly after

Appellant was admitted to the hospital, one John Linebaugh,
a medical technician, extracted and seized a specimen of
blood from Appellant's body for the purpose of having determined the alcohol content therein.

(R.85)

At the preliminary hearing in this matter, Mr.

-2-
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Linebaugh testified that he is not a licensed physician,
registered or practical nurse.

(R. 31-32)

Mr. Linebaugh

also testified that although a doctor and one or more
nurses were in and out of the room in which Mr. Linebaugh
extracted the specimen of Appellant's blood (R.74-75), no
doctor or nurse supervised his activities at the time he
extracted the blood specimen from Appellant.

(R.74-75)

Mr.

Linebaugh further testified that prior to extracting blood
from Appellant, he advised Appellant that he was extracting
a specimen of his blood for purposes of an alcohol content
analysis, and that the result of the analysis could be
used against the Appellant in court.

(R.75)

Mr. Linebuagh

testified that following this explanation, the Appellant
responded, "O.K., go ahead,"

(R.75), and that Appellant

appeared to be in a great deal of pain at the time.

(R.75-

76)
On the basis of Mr. Linebaugh1s testimony at the
preliminary hearing, Appellant objected to the admission in
evidence of the result

of the blood alcohol analysis, which

the State attempted to introduce through the testimony of
Dr. Albert Swensen

(R.63-65), on the ground that Mr. Line-

baugh was not authorized to draw a specimen of Appellant's

-3-
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blood for purposes of a blood alcohol analysis, pursuant to
Section 41-6-44.10, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, as that statute
has been construed by this Court in Gibbs v. Dorius, No.
13626, decided March, 1975.

(R.64-65)

The Court overruled

the objection and received the testimony of Dr. Swensen
concerning the result of the blood alcohol analysis in
evidence.

(R.65)

Subsequently, the Court bound the Appellant

over to stand trial in the District Court.
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to
suppress the result of a blood alcohol analysis as evidence,
on the ground that the search of his person and seizure of
his blood were accomplished by one not authorized to extract
blood for the purpose of having determined the alcohol content
therein, pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10, U.C.A. (1953), as
amended.

(R.29-41)

The Court denied the Motion to Suppress.

(R.42)
At trial, Mr. Linebaugh testified substantially
as he had at the preliminary hearing concerning the circumstances under which he seized a specimen
blood for a blood alcohol analysis.

of the Appellant's

(R.85-87)

Appellant

renewed the Motion to Suppress the result of the blood alcohol
analysis on the grounds previously urged (R.97);
again denied the Motion

the Court

and permitted Dr. Swensen to testify
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as to the result of the blood alcohol analysis and give an
opinion as to the sobriety of Appellant at the time of the
accident based upon the result of the blood alcohol analysis.
Over the objection of Appellant, the Court
instructed the jury that the mental state of "negligence"
required for the commission of the offense of automobile .
homicide consisted in the:
Failure to use ordinary and
reasonable care in the management of one's property or
person. It is the failure
to do what an ordinary or
reasonable person would have
done under the circumstances
or the doing of what such
person would not have done.
The fault may lie in acting
or omitting to act. (R.22)
Appellant objected to the above instruction because it is
an instruction on "ordinary" or simple negligence whereas the
penal statutes of this State, including the statutes defining
the offense of automobile homicide,0 require that one charged
with the offense act with the mental state of "criminal negligence", in respect to the conduct constituting the offense,
in order to be convicted thereof.

(R.ll)

-5-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE RESULT OF A BLOOD
ALCOHOL ANALYSIS PERFORMED UPON
A SPECIMEN OF APPELLANT'S BLOOD,
WHERE THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S
PERSON OR SEIZURE OF HIS BLOOD
WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY ONE NOT AUTHORIZED TO EXTRACT BLOOD FOR THE
PURPOSE OF HAVING DETERMINED THE
ALCOHOL CONTENT THEREIN, PURSUANT
TO SECTION 41-6-44.10, U.C.A.
(1953), AS AMENDED.
The Constitution of the State of Utah contains
a provision identical to- that found in the Federal Constitution
barring unreasonable searches and seizures.

Article I, Section

XIV of the Utah Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to
*• be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant
shall issued but upon probable
cause supported oath or affirmation, particularly describing
a place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.
In Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757 (1956),
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the United States Supreme Court held that under the Federal
Constitution, the taking of a blood specimen from an individual, even without his consent, to determine the alcohol content therein, does not constitute an unreasonable search and
seizure, provided that the procedure is performed under protected conditions by competent, medical personnel.

Section 41-

6-44.10(f), U.C.A. (1953), as amended, describes and delimits
the persons who are deemed competent to draw blood for the
purpose of determining its alcohol content in the State of Utah.
That section provides:
Only a physician, registered
nurse, practical nurse, or
duly authorized laboratory
technician, acting at the
request of a police officer,
can withdraw blood for the
purpose of determining the
alcoholic or drug content
therein....
In the instant case, a sample of Appellant's
blood was extracted by Mr. John Linebaugh for the purpose of
having determined the alcohol content therein.

At the prelim-

inary hearing and the trial in this matter, Mr. Linebaugh
testified that he is not a licensed physician, registered
nurse, or practical nurse.

(R.73-74,90)

Thus, Mr. Linebaugh

was not legally authorized to extract a sample of Appellant's

-7-
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blood for the purpose of having its alcohol content determined, unless he was acting as a "duly authorized technician"
within the meaning of Section 41-6-44.10(f), U.C.A. (1953),
as amended.
In the recent case of Gibbs v. Dorius, Utah,
P.2d

, No. 13626, decided March 14, 1975, this Court

construed the term "duly authorized laboratory technician"
contained in Section 41-6-44.10(f), U.C.A. (1953), as amended,
in deciding that the failure of the State to provide a "duly
authorized laboratory technician" to withdraw blood from the
Defendant Gibbs for the purpose of determining its alcohol
content, rendered the taking of the Defendant's blood illegal,
such that the State could not revoke Gibb's driver's license
for refusal to submit to the blood test.
Reviewing the legislative intent and history of
Section 41-6-44.10(f), the Court concluded that:
Duly authorized laboratory
technician must be interpreted
as referring to the Utah
Medical Practice Act, since
the act of withdrawing blood
is the practice of medicine, the
actual introduction of a needle
into a human body goes beyond
the performance of a laboratory
examination. (Section 58-12-38
required that such performance
be at the request or under the
direction of a person licensed
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under Chapter 12, Title 38),
and falls within the preview
of service rendered by a
physician's assistant. Section
58-12-40 requires that the
activities of the assistant
be under the supervision and
direction of a physician and
that the latter be liable for
the acts and omissions of the
former. Within the context of
41-6-44.10(f), the term "duly
authorized laboratory technician"
means an individual acting under
the direction and supervision of
a licensed physician, such a
person must administer the test
... according to the standard
medical practice.
In Gibbs, this Court indicates that the terms
of Section 41-6-44.10(f), are "an express concession by the
legislature that the drawing of blood from a human being is
the practice of medicine" and that, regardless of education or
experience, a medical technician is not authorized to engage
in this aspect of medical practice unless a physician, registered or practical nurse is present to supervise and direct
the technician.

Evidence presented in the Gibbs, supra, case

demonstrated that the technician there possessed the
following qualifications:

-9-
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that he was a chemist with the
City-County Health Department,
a medical technologist with
the United States Navy in World
War II, that he held a bachelor
of arts degree in bacteriology
and chemistry, and that he was
authorized by the Division of
Health, and was on the approved
list with the State Department
of Health, and that the State
Department monitored him as to
his procedure in running bloodalcohol tests
If anything, the technician in Gibbs possessed
more education and experience than the technician in the
instant case, who testified as to his qualifications at the
preliminary hearing and at trial.

(R.69-70, 84-85)

Never-

theless, this Court held in Gibbs, supra, that there was no
evidence that the technician was a "duly authorized technician"
within the meaning of Section 41-6-44.10 (f)•
Although the Court in Gibbs partially premised
its determination that the technician there was not a "legally
authorized medical technician" because the State had failed to
introduce sufficient evidence to show that the blood extraction
procedure had been conducted "according to standard medical practice", (the Court was concerned about the possibility of unsanitary conditions in .the jail where the Defendant Gibb's blood

-10-
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i

was drawn) , it is clear that even had the technician in
Gibbs, supra, withdrawn the Defendant's blood "according to
the standard medical procedure", that the technician was not
authorizied to take the Defendant Gibb's blood because he did
not do so under the direction and supervision of a physician,
practical or registered nurse as required pursuant to Section
41-6-44.10(f).
In the instant case, Mr. Linebaugh testified at
the preliminary hearing and the trial in this matter that no
physician, registered or practical nurse supervised or directed
him as he undertook to extract a specimen of blood from
Appellant, although a doctor and several nurses were in and
out of the room.

(R.74-75,86)

Although the technician testified

he had a general supervisor at the hospital whom he identified
as Dr. Call (R.74-75), Appellant submits that the decision of
this court in Gibbs, supra, requires that a medical technician
be immediately directed and supervised by a physician, registered or practical nurse at the moment the technician is engaged
in extracting blood from a person for purposes of Section 41-644.10(f), and that supervision in some general sense, in that
the technician has a nominal supervisor or that doctors or
nurses are present somewhere in the hospital, is not adequate
to effect the legislature's intent to protect a person whose

-11-
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blood being taken, from the risk of injury at the time a
needle is inserted into his body by one who is not licensed
to practice medicine.

Certainly, state statutes require that

the cited section be given this interpretation to effect its
purpose.

(See Sections 58-3-2, 76-1-2, U.C.A., (1953), as

amended.)
Whereas the technician in the instant case admitted
that he was not acting under the direction or supervision of
a physician, registered or practical nurse at the time he
extracted a blood specimen from the Appellant's body, Appellant
respectfully submits that the technician was not authorized
to take his blood pursuant to Section 41-7-44.10(f), U.C.A
(1953), and that the seizure of his blood was thus illegal
and in violation of rights secured to Appellant pursuant to
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of
the United States and Article I, Section XIV of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and that the Court below committed
error in admitting the results of the blood-alcohol analysis
as evidence in the prosecution of the Appellant.

-12-
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION
TO THE JURY CONCERNING THE MENTAL
STATE OF NEGLIGENCE REQUIRED FOR
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE.
The Appellant, Bert James Durrant, was charged
with commission of "automobile homicide", pursuant to Section
76-5-207, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, which provides:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes
automobile homicide if the actor,
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance
or any drug, to a degree which renders
the actor incapable of safely driving
a vehicle, causes the death of
another by operating a motor vehicle
in a negligent manner. (Emphasis
supplied)
The offense of automobile homicide is one of
four offenses, the others being murder in the first and
second degrees, manslaughter, and negligent homicide, which
are encompassed in the general offense of "criminal homicide",
established in Section 76-5-201, U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
The cited section indicates that one commits "criminal homicide if he
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly
or with criminal negligence unlawfully
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causes the death of another*
(Emphasis supplied)
Although the automobile homicide statute refers
only to the "negligent" operation of a motor vehicle which
results in the death of another, it is axiomatic that one may
not be legally convicted of "automobile homicide", a form
of "criminal homicide", unless he is shown to be "criminally
negligent" with respect to the conduct constituting the alleged
automobile homicide, including his conduct with respect to
the operation of a motor vehicle.

That the term "negligence"

in the statute defining the offense of "automobile homicide"
should be interpreted as contemplating the requirement of
"criminal", as opposed to "ordinary", negligence is supported
not only by the language of the statutes defining "automobile
homicide" and "criminal homicide", but also by those sections
of the State Code of Criminal Procedure generally delineating
the requirements of criminal conduct and criminal responsibility.
Pursuant to Sections 77-2-101, 102, and 104, U.C.A. (1953),
as amended, no conduct is punishable as an offense unless
the conduct is prohibited by law and done "intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence" with
respect to each element of the offense charged.

The only

exception to this requirement occurs where the conduct
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prohibited constitutes an offense involving strict liability.
Assuming then, that one may not be convicted
of the odrfense of automobile homicide unless one acts with
a mental state which is "criminally negligent" in respect
to the conduct constituting the offense, decisions of this
Court are unanimous in proclaiming that "criminal negligence"
may not be established by the showing of a "mere thoughtless
omission or slight deviation from the norm of prudent conduct",
State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 806, 463 P.2d 806 (1970); and that
there must enter into the act some measure of wantonness
for flagrant or reckless disregard for the safety of others
in order to constitute "criminal negligence".

State v.

Bassett, 27 Utah 2d 272, 495 P.2d 318(1972); State v. Lingman,
97 Utah 180, 91 P.2d 457 (1939).

This conception of "criminal

negligence" is precisely that embodied in Section 76-2-H103,
U.C.A. (1953), as amended, which provides that:
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Omitted
(2) Omitted
(3) Omitted
(4) With criminal negligence or
is criminally negligent with respect
to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the

-15-
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result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and
degree that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person
would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint.
In instructing the jury that the "negligence"
necessary for the commission of "automobile homicide" consisted
only in ordinary or simple negligence (R.22), the trial court
seriously prejudiced the right of the Appellant to a fair trial
by permitting the jury to convict the Appellant for conduct
undertaken with a less culpable and different mental state than
that actually required for the commission of the offense
pursuant to State statutes defining the offense of automobile
homicide.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated. Appellant contends
that the Court below erred in denying Appellant's Motion To
Suppress the result of a blood alcohol analysis as evidence
against the Defendant and that the Court erred in instructing
the jury, over Appellant1s objection, that the mental state of

-16-
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negligence required for the commission of the offense of
automobile homicide consisted in "ordinary" rather than
"criminal" negligence.

Therefore, Appellant Bert James

Durrant respectfully submits that the conviction and judgment
below be reversed, or in the alternative, that Appellant be
granted a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

Kathryn Cfo/lard
Attorney for Appellant
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